An interesting read. In pdf format.

An excerpt:

"The insurgency seems to remain largely Iraqi and Sunni dominated. Some 35 Sunni Arab
groups have made some kind of public announcement or claimed responsibility for
terrorist or insurgent attacks – although many may be little more than cells and some may
be efforts to shift the blame for attacks or make the insurgent movement seem larger than
it is. An overwhelming majority of those captured or killed have been Iraqi Sunnis, as
well as something like 90-95% of those detained.

These insurgents have suffered significant tactical defeats since early 2004, notably in
Najaf, Baghdad, Samarra, Fallujah, and Mosul. Nevertheless, US and Iraqi government
attempts to root out the insurgency have so far only had limited impact. There is no
evidence that number of insurgents is declining as a result of Coalition and Iraqi attacks
to date. The number of insurgent attacks has been consistently high since the spring of
2004, although the pattern fluctuates over time.

Insurgent cadres have steadily become more experienced, adapting tactics and methods of
attack as fast as Coalition can counter them. Coalition troops reported that insurgents in
Fallujah utilized an improved RPG in efforts to counter armored vehicles. The fighting
in September-November of 2004 has shown they are developing networks with some
form of central command, planning, and financing.

They work with criminal elements for effective looting and sabotage campaigns. The
insurgents and their criminal allies also understand the limits of Coalition ability to cover
the given areas and vulnerabilities. Many patterns of Coalition, Iraqi government, and
Iraqi forces activity are easily observed and have to be predictable. Bases can often be
observed and are vulnerable at their entrances, to rocket and mortar attacks, and along
their supply lines. There are many soft and relatively soft small isolated facilities. Aid
projects are easy to infiltrate and to target when nearing completion. NGO or contractor
headquarters are easily observable targets. Infrastructure and energy facilities are typical
of targets that have long lines of pipes or wires and many vulnerable links. Media have to
more to be effective, as do emergency workers and medical teams. A nation is inevitably
filled with soft or vulnerable targets that insurgents can choose at will, and experience
has taught the insurgents and terrorists a great deal.

The problem is broader. As has been touched upon in Chapter III, the insurgents have
good sources in the Iraqi Interim Government and forces, Iraqi society and sometimes in
local US and Coalition commands. This is inevitable, and little can be done to stop it.
Iraq simply lacks the resources and data to properly vet all of the people it recruits. Many
Iraqis only work for the government or in the Iraqi forces because they cannot find other
employment, and/or quietly sympathize with the insurgents, the workers in US and
government facilities, and in various aid and construction projects, are even harder to vet.
Men who do support the government are vulnerable to threats against the families,
kidnappings, and actual murders of friends and relatives.

US human intelligence is improving but is hurt badly -- as are civil-military and other
efforts – by high turnover and rotations. Most Iraqi networks serving the US in hostile
areas have serious quality and loyalty problems, while others either use their positions to
settle scores or misinform Coalition troops."