Congressmen probe Iraq war memo

Mr Blair and Mr Bush deny the war was planned so far in advance
A group of US congressmen is holding a hearing into a leaked UK memo which suggests President Bush had decided on war with Iraq eight months in advance.

More than 100 Democrats will take part in the public forum, calling for a White House explanation of the memo.

The BBC's James Coomarasamy, in Washington, says although the hearing is unofficial, it coincides with waning public support for US efforts in Iraq.

Mr Bush denies he had made up his mind at the time to attack Saddam Hussein.

The British Sunday Times newspaper published the so-called Downing Street memo, dated 23 July 2002, on 1 May, after it was leaked by a former UK foreign policy aide.

In the memo, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw is quoted as saying Mr Bush had made up his mind to take military action even if the timing had not yet been decided.

A second memo, published by the paper this week, says UK ministers were told that they had no choice but to find a way to make the war in Iraq legal.

Scant US coverage

Our correspondent says the congressmen want to raise awareness of what is a slow-burning political issue.

"We want our Congress to stand up, to identify and investigate the lies."
-Celeste Zappala
Gold Star Families for Peace

Bloggers' war memo victory

The affair has received scant coverage in the mainstream US media, although left-wing bloggers have had some success in bringing it to public attention.

"Our investigation is just commencing and I can tell you more and more people are getting disturbed, some outraged, by what these disclosures suggest has happened," Michigan Congressman John Conyers told the Associated Press news agency.

Mr Conyers has urged Republicans to take part in the House of Representatives' hearing, though none appears to have agreed to do so.

However, around 500,000 Americans have signed a petition against the war.

Gold Star Families for Peace, a non-partisan group, has expressed its support for the hearing.

"We want our Congress to stand up, to identify and investigate the lies and follow it wherever it goes," Celeste Zappala, who lost a son in Iraq, told AP.

Reg Keys, who has campaigned against the war in the UK since his son was killed in Iraq, is expected to give evidence at the hearing and address a public rally outside the White House.

'Peaceful solution sought'

The hearing comes as polls suggest nearly three-quarters of Americans view the US casualty rate in Iraq as unacceptable.

For the first time, a majority appears to believe that the war has not improved long-term US security.

Mr Bush says that at the time of the memo he was prepared to find a peaceful way to deal with Saddam Hussein.

"Somebody said we had made up our mind to use military force to deal with Saddam," he said.

"There is nothing further from the truth. My conversation with the prime minister was ' How can we do this peacefully?'"

White House officials say the president is now planning to sharpen his focus on Iraq, but there is no suggestion that this will involve any policy change.
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Isn't it more then obvious from Woodward, O'Neil, and Clarke that these guys had Iraq on the chopping block on 9/12/01? They just needed to sell it to the American public. A great documentary on all the lies and deception leading up to this war: http://www.truthuncovered.com/
And you can watch the whole documentary here: http://www.informationclearinghouse.inf ... le6423.htm

You'd seriously have to have been born yesterday to believe that the Iraq war was not planned months in advance. Not just that they had budgeted for it, planned how they're going to do it if they they decided to invade... but that they had actually already decided to do so. Plan of Attack all but says as much.

Well, duh.

Alright, so I can see the consensus will most likely be that this Administration chose Iraq long before it began war with it. We see they continue to lie about when they decided to go to war. These people lied to the American public and Congress time and time again. This is not anything new I understand. BUT only once to my reccolection have such lies costed so much. Human life in the hundreds of thousands and treasure at a quarter of a trillion American taxpayers dollars. Where is this money going? Well some is obvious. But whent the Pentagon loses trillions of dollars as this Administration has had on it's clock. Remember the GAO made attempts to sue the Executive Branch for it not turning over documents that EVERY past Administration had. They dropped it when the Cheney Administration threatened to cut them out in spending, one suit is still going. A few pages have come out of this highly secret document which is Cheney May 2000 Energy Task Force. Which included blueprints for the oil fields of Iraq's oil fields. Secrecy is so tight on this ship because any slip ups and the whole things going down.

So we can agree that lies and deception were used to create a war with Iraq regardless of the legititmate reasons behind such military action and the claims made to the world to support it?

Absolutely. I just saw Bill Clinton say the same thing on Letterman tonight.

There were war plans for Iraq on the table when Bush took office. There were war plans on the table for Afghanistan when Bush took office. I garauntee you there are full blown war plans for a whole bunch of nations on the table right now. Emergency budgets allotted, logistics planned, the whole nine yards.

How trite.

No, we can't. I really grow tired of hearing and reading about "lies and deception" leading up to the war with Iraq. You just don't get it. I've said it before and I'll say it again. EVERYTHING, I mean EVERYTHING changed after 9/11 (you know, when the planes crashed into the WTC and they COLLAPSED). An event like 9/11 is what what put Saddam Hussein back in the crosshairs. He had to go. Period. I agree we had some faulty intelligence, but that's as far as it goes.

You're right. We didn't really have a choice but to change intelligence that said Sadaam had nothing to do with 9/11, so that it looked like Sadaam actually DID have something to do with 9/11.

I would be upset with any war that was not planned in advance.


This is good news!

I love when IEB is pro administration.

I don't have a problem with having contingency plans in a drawer, kind of a "If we ever have to declare war on Iraq, this is how we win" thing. If that's what this was, it would be trite. But I think what the Downing Street Memo shows is that Bush was planning a war with Iraq regardless of whether intelligence said that such a war was called for or not. THAT, is not trite and is not cool with me.

And as it turns out, we apparently didn't have anything like, "If we ever have to declare war on Iraq, this is how we win," either.

Media Advisory

Justifying the Silence on Downing Street Memos

6/17/05

One of the features of the newfound media interest in the Downing Street Memo is a profound defensiveness, as reporters scramble to explain why it received so little attention in the U.S. press. But the most familiar line--the memo wasn't news because it contained no "new" information--only raises troubling questions about what journalists were doing when they should have been reporting on the gulf between official White House pronouncements and actual White House intentions.

There are two important points in the Downing Street Memo, and media apologists have marshaled slightly different--though equally unconvincing--arguments as to why each did not deserve coverage. The first point is that the White House was intent on going to war long before it announced the decision to invade Iraq; "It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action," the memo states, citing British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw.

The Washington Post editorialized (6/15/05): "The memos add not a single fact to what was previously known about the administration's prewar deliberations. Not only that: They add nothing to what was publicly known in July 2002." The New York Times reported (6/14/05) that "the documents are not quite so shocking. Three years ago, the near-unanimous conventional wisdom in Washington held that Mr. Bush was determined to topple Saddam Hussein by any means necessary." NBC reporter Andrea Mitchell similarly remarked on June 14 (Media Matters, 6/15/05) that you had to be "brain dead not to know" what the White House was doing.

But if everyone knew it was a lie when Bush and the White House repeatedly denied that they had decided to go to war (as with Bush's March 6, 2003 statement, "I have not made up our mind about military action"), why were reporters not exposing this bad faith at every turn? On March 16, 2003, for example, Andrea Mitchell referred to negotiations at the United Nations as part of "the diplomatic campaign to avoid war." If war was a foregone conclusion, why were such talks reported as if they mattered?

And how should reporters treat recent comments by George W. Bush that war was a last resort? "Both of us [Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair] didn't want to use our military," he said at a June 7 press conference. "Nobody wants to commit military into combat. It's the last option." If this is known to be a lie, why isn't it identified as such in news reports? If there's some doubt about whether he's lying, isn't the Downing Street Memo important evidence as to what the truth is?

The second issue raised by the Downing Street Memo regards the fixing of intelligence. On this question, media responses differ somewhat: The memo is inconclusive, some say, or investigations into intelligence tampering have shown that such claims are without merit. The June 15 Washington Post editorial claimed that "the memos provide no information that would alter the conclusions of multiple independent investigations on both sides of the Atlantic, which were that U.S. and British intelligence agencies genuinely believed Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and that they were not led to that judgment by the Bush administration."

The investigations the Post is alluding to are irrelevant, since they did not specifically address the question of how the White House handled intelligence reports on Iraq. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigation was limited in scope; as the Washington Post reported (7/10/04), the panel "[made] no judgment on whether the administration distorted the intelligence it was given." A more recent review of intelligence practices was similarly limited--a fact also reported by the Washington Post (4/1/05): "The panel that Bush appointed under pressure in February 2004 said it was 'not authorized' to explore the question of how the commander in chief used the faulty information to make perhaps the most critical decision of his presidency."

More important, however, is the fact that the Downing Street Memo does suggest that the British government did not believe the evidence of Iraq's WMD programs was strong. As the memo states, "the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran."

The case for the politicization of intelligence is not difficult to make--it merely involves citing evidence the media ignored at the time. In its March 3, 2003 issue, Newsweek reported what should have been a bombshell: The star defector who supplied some of the most significant information about Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction had told investigators that those weapons no longer existed.

Iraq defector Hussein Kamel--Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, who ran Iraq's unconventional weapons programs--was debriefed in 1995 about the status of those programs. Some of what Kamel said to the weapons inspectors would become very familiar: 30,000 liters of anthrax had been produced by the Iraqi regime, for example, and four tons of the VX nerve agent. These specific quantities were cited repeatedly by White House officials to make the case for war, and were staples of media coverage in the run-up to war.

But Kamel told the inspectors something else: that Iraq had destroyed these stockpiles soon after the Gulf War. "All weapons-- biological, chemical, missile, nuclear-- were destroyed," Kamel told the inspectors.

At the time, FAIR pointed out (2/27/03) that White House officials were misleading the public by selectively citing the Kamel interview: "Their repeated citations of his testimony--without revealing that he also said the weapons no longer exist--suggests that the administration might be withholding critical evidence."

Despite their obvious importance, the Kamel revelations were barely mentioned in the mainstream media. This fact is worth remembering when journalists claim that pre-war media coverage was remarkably prescient about the White House's intentions. The truth is that the Downing Street Memo is a reminder of how poorly the media served the public before the war-- which might explain their reluctance to take it seriously.

http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2556

Your response tells me you have no clue what you're talking about. No one has EVER said Hussein had anything to do with 9/11, nor did anyone try to make intelligence show that he did. Try reading my original reply again.

So everything changed after 9/11. You acknowledge Saddam had nothing to do w/ 9/11. So why was Saddam in the crosshairs again? Both of your replies are truly head scratchers.

I agree.

Before the US invaded Iraq, President Bush said he had intelligence evidence that "Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda."

They repeatedly advanced the idea that Saddam could one day furnish nuclear, biological or chemical weapons to al Qaeda or other terrorists.

http://www.factcheck.org/article203.html

Do you not recall Cheney on Meet the Press talking about the Atta-Iraq Prague meeting. That supposively took place from a Czech report. That is a clear case where this Administration was trying to make connections between 9/11 and Iraq. After attempts by this Administration to get something to stick failed, Bush finally had to admit no connection existed between Iraq and 9/11.

So your dead wrong in saying that no one try to make intelligence show Iraq and 9/11 were connected.

So does anyone know where I can view/read an actual copy of the Downing Street memo? I'm familiar with what's supposed to be in it but something like this I would like to actually see for myself. I just tried thesmokingun.com and got nothing. Any help would be appreciated.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0, ... 07,00.html

May 01, 2005

The secret Downing Street memo

::nobreak::SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

Thank you.

I am Jesus Christ. Send me $100 and I will guarantee your salvation. Address forthcoming in PM.

Mr. RUSSERT: Has anything changed, in your mind?

VICE PRES. CHENEY LYING: Well, I want to be very careful about how I say this. I’m not here today to make a specific allegation that Iraq was somehow responsible for 9/11. I can’t say that. On the other hand, since we did that interview, new information has come to light. And we spent time looking at that relationship between Iraq, on the one hand, and the al-Qaeda organization on the other. And there has been reporting that suggests that there have been a number of contacts over the years. We’ve seen in connection with the hijackers, of course, Mohamed Atta, who was the lead hijacker, did apparently travel to Prague on a number of occasions. And on at least one occasion, we have reporting that places him in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official a few months before the attack on the World Trade Center. The debates about, you know, was he there or wasn’t he there, again, it’s the intelligence business.

From the 9-11 Commission "Staff Statement 16":

We have examined the allegation that Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague on April 9. Based on the evidence available -- including investigation by Czech and U.S. authorities plus detainee reporting -- we do not believe that such a meeting occurred.

http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/ ... ent_16.pdf